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I. INTRODUCTION
Many everyday conveniences that most Americans take for granted
were accidental discoveries. In 1928, Sir Alexander Fleming inadvertently
discovered the antibiotic properties of penicillin when a species of
Penicillium mold contaminated an agar plate full of bacteria in his
laboratory.1 Shortly after the end of World War II, Raytheon engineer Percy
Spencer stumbled upon the idea for microwave ovens after a chocolate bar
melted in his pocket while he was standing next to a large magnetron that
*
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Dayton School of Law), Ria Farrell Schalnat (Frost Brown Todd), and Josh Lorentz (Dinsmore & Shohl)
for their thoughtful commentary and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank my husband for his
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1
MILTON WAINWRIGHT, MIRACLE CURE: THE STORY OF PENICILLIN AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF
ANTIBIOTICS 16-17, 19 (1990).
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had powered Allied radar during the War.2 Unlike the serendipitous
discoveries of penicillin and microwave ovens, the vast majority of
scientific innovation leading to patentable inventions occurs slowly and
methodically. At the heart of this process is the scientific method, which
involves predicting an outcome based on known methods and using
controlled testing to determine whether the prediction holds true.
The goal of the United States patent law system is to promote the
progress of technology by encouraging and rewarding innovation. This goal
is reflected in the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”3 From its inception, the Intellectual
Property Clause endeavored to strike a balance between promoting
innovation for the benefit of the public while avoiding unnecessary
monopolies that restrain competition.4 In order to receive the reward of a
patent monopoly, modern patent law requires that an invention be new,
useful, and nonobvious.5 An invention that is an obvious combination of
known elements from the prior art is not deserving of patent protection.6
While many patent lawyers consider the nonobviousness inquiry to
be the most important patentability requirement, a practical and objective
nonobviousness standard remains elusive.7 In 2007, the Supreme Court
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. upended almost twentyfive years of nonobviousness case law from the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.8 Perhaps most unsettling about the KSR decision is the
statement that inventions created “according to known methods . . . [that]
yield predictable results” are unpatentable.9 This statement is particularly
troubling because science progresses by predicting a result and applying
known methods to test the prediction.

2

J. Carlton Gallawa, A Brief History of the Microwave Oven, SOUTHWEST MUSEUM OF
ENGINEERING, COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATION, http://www.smecc.org/microwave_oven.htm (last
visited May 2, 2010). Magnetrons are the source of microwave rays. Id.
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the “Intellectual Property Clause”). Although it may seem
counterintuitive, the term “science” in the Intellectual Property Clause actually refers to creative matter
that is the subject of copyright law, while the phrase “useful arts” refers to the subject matter of patent
law.
4
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
5
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103(a) (2006).
6
See id. § 103(a).
7
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 611 (4th ed. 2007).
8
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 415 (2007).
9
Id. at 416.
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The Supreme Court decision in KSR is inconsistent with the
scientific method. Because the decision embraces a policy that will prevent,
not promote, the progress of science, the decision is in direct opposition to
the constitutional mandate of the Intellectual Property Clause. This
Comment explores the effect of the KSR decision on the patent system,
specifically focusing on the opinion’s tension with the scientific method.
Section II briefly discusses the history of the scientific method and explores
the origin and evolution of the nonobviousness requirement. Section III
argues that some of the wording of the KSR opinion conflicts with the
underlying basis of the scientific method and that the opinion fails to
address the significant problem of hindsight bias. Finally, Section IV
concludes that the KSR decision has left the nonobviousness inquiry in an
uncertain state that will cause problems for the patent system in the years to
come.10
II. BACKGROUND
To appreciate the significance of the KSR decision, it is important to
first understand the history of both the scientific method and the patent
system. Part A discusses the history of the scientific method and its modern
formulation. Part B discusses the origin of patent law and addresses the
history and evolution of the nonobviousness requirement. Part C explores
the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its impact on
patent law. Part D provides a full analysis of the KSR decision. Finally,
Part E discusses some of the immediate effects of KSR on the patent system.
A. A Brief History of the Scientific Method
“If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of
giants.” ~ Sir Isaac Newton11
Newton’s humble quote succinctly summarizes the basic concept of
the scientific method: science progresses slowly by carefully observing
natural phenomena and building upon what is already known. The modern
scientific method traces its origins to the teachings of several ancient Greek
philosophers, including Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (582-322
B.C.).12 Plato and Pythagoras introduced and refined the idea of the
hypothesis, while Aristotle introduced the use of logic, reasoning, and

10
The scope of this Comment is limited to identifying and discussing the problem created by KSR’s
potential conflict with the scientific method. Any suggestions of solutions to this problem are left for a
later time.
11
ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 1 (1965). This
quote is almost universally attributed to Newton, but, ironically, it is a variation of a much older adage.
Id. at 2-3, 32-33. One of the earliest written records of the quote comes from Bernard of Chartres, who
died in 1126, some 500 years before Newton’s use of the saying. Id. at 37, 40.
12
W.S. FOWLER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 4-11 (1962).
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observation to the study of natural phenomena.13 The ancient philosophers
believed that knowledge was derived from observation and that the
truthfulness of a fact could be demonstrated by showing how it was derived
from what was “already known and understood . . . .”14
In the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon was among the first to
recognize the importance of controlled and systematic experimentation for
the testing of hypotheses.15 In the late sixteenth to early seventeenth
century, Sir Francis Bacon laid the groundwork for the structure and theory
of the modern scientific method.16 He introduced and solidified the idea that
investigation and understanding come from a series of “gradual inductions”
that lead to the formation of a hypothesis.17 Although many of Sir Francis
Bacon’s theories have been rejected as too simplistic, his idea that progress
comes from a “gradual passage from concrete facts to broader and broader
generalizations” still guides scientific theory and progress today.18
Science has been defined in modern times as “truth arrived at by
observation, experiment, [and] induction.”19 Contemporary scientists
fundamentally believe that the world can be understood, and although ideas
are constantly evolving and emerging, much of the underlying scientific
knowledge remains unchanged once it has been established.20 These basic
beliefs are apparent in the steps of the modern scientific method:
a. Based upon observation, the scientist comes
up with a testable question.
b. The scientist then performs background
research to see what has already been done
and what theories and evidence already
exist.
c. Based on this research, the scientist forms
an educated hypothesis that predicts a result
for what will occur in subsequent
experiments.

13

Id. at 15, 19-21; RALPH M. BLAKE ET AL., THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD: THE RENAISSANCE
THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 22 (Edward H. Madden ed., 1960).
14
BARRY GOWER, SCIENTIFIC METHOD: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 24
(2002).
15
FOWLER, supra note 12, at 35-36.
16
BLAKE ET AL., supra note 13, at 52-53.
17
Id. at 53-54.
18
Id. at 69.
19
F. Lyth Hudson, Scientific Method and the Nature of Technology, 4858 NATURE 933, Dec. 8,
1962, at 933.
20
AMERICAN ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, SCIENCE FOR ALL AMERICANS: A
PROJECT 2061 REPORT ON LITERACY GOALS IN SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 25-26
(1989).
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d. The scientist then applies known controlled
methods to test the hypothesis.
e. The scientist draws conclusions based upon
the results of the experiments and refines
the hypothesis, building upon the
experimental results to arrive at an answer
for the original question.21
The scientific method is a fundamental tool for any technology.22
While scientists in different fields may use different techniques, “the process
of formulating and testing hypotheses” to predict a particular outcome is
“one of the core activities of scientists,” and “[t]o be useful, a hypothesis
should suggest what evidence would support it and what evidence would
refute it.”23 In other words, science progresses by testing educated
predictions using known methods. With that brief introduction to the
scientific method, the history of the nonobviousness requirement in patent
law and the KSR decision may now be considered in context.
B. The Patent Law System and the Nonobviousness Requirement
While the concept of protection for new inventions dates back to at
least 400 B.C.,24 the American patent system traces its origins to English
law.25 Starting around the sixteenth century, the English kings and queens
began using patents to grant manufacturing monopolies as a reward to
inventors of useful new products and processes.26 Many patents were
properly granted as a reward for innovation, but the English royalty quickly
began to use (and abuse) monopoly grants as a way to reward political
support, creating a long-lasting hostility toward patent monopolies.27
Despite its significant faults, the British patent system arguably helped to
power the Industrial Revolution, and “it seems no coincidence that the
patent system matured alongside the early industrial technologies.”28
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonies largely
followed the English patent system.29 After the Revolution, the American
21

See FOWLER, supra note 12, at 94; Hudson, supra note 19, at 933.
Hudson, supra note 19, at 935.
23
AMERICAN ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, supra note 20, at 26-27.
24
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1. A fourth century B.C. document reflects a discussion
between Aristotle and Hippodamas in which the two Greek philosophers debated the merits of a reward
system for citizens who discovered new and useful things. Id.
25
Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259-60 (2001).
26
Id. at 1260.
27
Id. at 1264-65.
28
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 6.
29
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background
and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1,
14-15 (1994).
22
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patent system experienced a “significant renewal of patenting activity,”
during which the individual states began issuing patents.30 The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention decided to include a constitutional grant of
power to Congress to issue patent and copyright protection, in part to
resolve conflicts between state-issued patents.31
However, compared to the other clauses in the United States
Constitution, the Intellectual Property Clause has little written history, and it
is somewhat of a mystery as to how it came into being.32 Over half of the
delegates to the Convention had some sort of legal training and were more
than likely very familiar with the benefits and drawbacks of the English
patent system.33 With the memories of the royal abuse of patents fresh on
their minds, the delegates were reluctant to give the new American
government the unfettered right to create any sort of monopoly.34 The
Intellectual Property Clause provided a “limited and acceptable” exception
to the “general ban on monopolies.”35 Additionally, the Clause presented a
simple and cost-effective way for the federal government to encourage and
reward progress and innovation.36
The first long-term federal patent statute was the Patent Act of
1793,37 and many of the basic patentability requirements of modern patent
law remain unchanged. Utility and novelty have both been requirements for
patentability since the inception of the patent system.38 However,
nonobviousness was a judicially created doctrine that arose later and was not
a separate statutory requirement for patentability prior to the current Patent
Act of 1952.39
1. Early Nonobviousness Cases
The judicially created nonobviousness requirement has evolved
considerably over the past 150 years. The 1850 Supreme Court case of
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood recognized the concept of obviousness over one
hundred years before its codification in the Patent Act of 1952.40 In
Hotchkiss, the Court considered the validity of a patent for a clay

30

Id. at 17.
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 7.
32
Walterscheid, supra note 29, at 26.
33
Id. at 25, 35-36.
34
Id. at 37-38.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 35.
37
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 202–03 (1999). The first patent statute
was passed in 1790 but was replaced three years later in response to problems with the 1790 Act. Id.
38
Sam S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of “Intangible” Yet “Physical” Subject Matter, 3
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 11-12, 18-20 (2002).
39
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 616.
40
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 262-64 (1850).
31
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doorknob.41 The accused infringer raised the defense that the plaintiff’s
product was simply a combination of two previously known elements and,
therefore, did not deserve patent protection.42 The Supreme Court agreed,
finding that clay doorknobs and the metal shank used to attach the doorknob
were both previously well-known as separate elements.43 The simple
substitution of clay for the usual metal or wood doorknob was nothing more
than the work of an “ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business” and
lacked the level of “skill and ingenuity” needed to constitute a patentable
invention.44
Almost one hundred years later, the Supreme Court issued Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. in which it created the
infamous “flash of genius” standard.45 The Court noted that, in order to be
patentable, “the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash
of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling.”46 Like KSR, Cuno
Engineering caused great concern at the time among patent lawyers, who
were concerned that the Supreme Court had driven the nonobviousness
standard so high that no invention would be patentable.47 Supreme Court
Justice Jackson commented in 1949 that “the Court had developed such a
‘strong passion’ for striking down patents under its increasingly stringent
invention standard ‘that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court
has not been able to get its hands on.’”48
Just prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the Supreme
Court issued Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp.49 The Court recognized the absence of a clear test for patents
involving combinations of known elements and also cautioned about the
level of care necessary when examining combination patents for the
presence of inventiveness.50 The Court then went on to state that the whole
of the combination must “exceed[] the sum of its parts” in order for the
invention to be patentable.51 The Court ultimately held that the invention in
41

Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 254.
43
Id. at 263.
44
Id. at 267.
45
Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
46
Id.
47
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 629. The United States Supreme Court’s treatment of patents
tends to create a cycle of pro-patent versus anti-patent rulings, dubbed the “patent pendulum.” Patrick
Doody, The Patent System is Not Broken, 18 No. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 16 (2006). A
number of recent patent decisions, including KSR, signal a swing of the patent pendulum back toward an
anti-patent sentiment. Seth Fox, Patent Pendulum, BATON ROUGE BUSINESS REPORT, July 17, 2007,
http://www.businessreport.com/news/2007/jul/17/patent-pendulum-legal/.
48
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 629 (quoting Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560,
572 (1949)).
49
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
50
Id. at 150-51.
51
Id. at 152. The requirement that a combination of known elements “exceed[] the sum of its parts”
became known as the synergistic result requirement. Id.; see also Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
42
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question was a combination of elements with “no change in their respective
functions,” making it unpatentable.52
2. The Patent Act of 1952 and Subsequent Cases
The Patent Act of 1952 is the current patent statute. The Act
codified the judicially created nonobviousness requirement into 35 U.S.C. §
103(a), which states:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.53
The Congressional Committee Reports for the Patent Act of 1952
stated that patentable subject matter should “include anything under the sun
that is made by man,” indicating that Congress intended for the new patent
statute to have broad coverage.54 Congress recognized the need for a
statutory nonobviousness requirement for inventions that were “new in the
sense that the same thing ha[d] not been made before” but were not
sufficiently different from the prior art to warrant a patent.55 Congress
intended for section 103(a) to provide “uniformity and definiteness” for the
nonobviousness inquiry and to “minimize great departures which have
appeared in some cases.”56 Section 103(a) was also intended to serve as a
basis for the later development of additional criteria by the court system.57
On its face, the language of section 103(a) seemed to be very
simple, but the courts have struggled for almost sixty years to define and
articulate workable standards for nonobviousness.58 The Supreme Court’s
first attempt to articulate a nonobviousness standard came in 1966 with the
companion cases of Graham v. John Deere Co.59 and U.S. v. Adams.60 In
Graham, the Court conceded that the last sentence of section 103(a) was
intended to abolish the “flash of genius” test established in Cuno
52

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
55
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
56
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2400.
57
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2411.
58
See Jon R. Trembath, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. – Obviousness Revisited, 37 COLO.
LAW. 35, 35-37 (2008).
59
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966). The Graham case is actually a consolidation of
three cases: Graham v. John Deere Co., Calmar Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co.
v. Cook Chemical Co. Id. at 4.
60
U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966).
53
54
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Engineering.61 Interestingly, the Supreme Court then concluded that the rest
of section 103(a) was simply an unaltered codification of previous judicial
precedents regarding the nonobviousness requirement.62
After recognizing that the nonobviousness determination was a
“mixed question of fact and law,”63 the Graham Court set out the familiar
four-factor test that still guides the factual aspect of nonobviousness
inquiries today: (1) “the scope and content of the prior art”; (2) the
“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue”; (3) “the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art”; and (4) the secondary considerations such
as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc.”64
In Adams, the Court recognized the validity of a patent for a
combination invention that achieved unexpected results in contradiction to
the teachings of the prior art and the opinions of experts.65 The invention in
Adams involved a water-activated electrical battery.66 Respected experts
expressed doubts as to the battery’s efficacy and practicality,67 and the prior
art taught away from the use of plain water as battery fluid.68 However, the
water-activated battery proved to be surprisingly functional, practical, and
efficient.69 The Supreme Court held that the invention was nonobvious
because it had overcome “known disadvantages” that would have “naturally
discourage[d] the search for new inventions” using this particular
combination of elements.70
Between 1966 and 1982, the Supreme Court issued two more
noteworthy decisions regarding nonobviousness.71 In Anderson’s-Black
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.72 and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,73 the
Supreme Court reemphasized the “synergistic result” requirement from
61

Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
Id. at 17. The wording chosen by Congress in the Congressional Reports regarding section 103(a)
and by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Graham decision is worth noting because of the constitutional
issues involved. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 660. The Supreme Court’s nonobviousness
decisions prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 were arguably constitutional standards,
prompting the Supreme Court and Congress to engage in a “delicate dance” over the years regarding the
nonobviousness requirement to avoid the issue of whether Congress was attempting to modify a
constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court. Id.
63
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s
Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 323, 326 (2008).
64
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The fourth factor was intended to “give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented,” if needed. Id. at 17-18.
65
Adams, 383 U.S. at 51-52.
66
Id. at 42-43.
67
Id. at 44.
68
Id. at 45-48.
69
Id. at 43-44.
70
Id. at 51-52.
71
Mandel, supra note 63, at 330-31.
72
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
73
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1976).
62
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Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.74 These two cases involved rather
unglamorous inventions, both of which were also relatively simple. The
invention in Anderson’s-Black Rock was an improved paving machine used
to lay asphalt.75 Sakraida involved an improvement of a water flush system
for removing animal waste from the floors of dairy barns.76 In both cases,
the inventions involved new combinations of old elements that were wellknown in the prior art.77 The Court held that the combined elements in both
inventions worked in the same fashion as they did individually and did not
produce an “effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken
separately.”78
Despite the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in Graham that a
determination of nonobviousness was a question of law and fact, the Court’s
opinions provided very little guidance for the lower courts regarding the
legal test for nonobviousness.79 The Graham factors regarding the analysis
of the prior art and the establishment of the ordinary level of skill in the art
constitute the factual aspect of the nonobviousness inquiry.80 The court then
makes the ultimate legal determination of nonobviousness by analyzing the
invention in light of the manner in which a person of ordinary skill would
have viewed the cited prior art.81 The Graham decision contained a detailed
analysis of the prior art but nothing on the level of ordinary skill in the art or
how to apply the factors for the nonobviousness inquiry.82 The Adams
decision and the subsequent cases did contain a more thorough discussion of
the level of ordinary skill in the art; rather than analyze the invention from
the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art, the Court largely
substituted its own judgment regarding nonobviousness in every case.83 Up
to this point, the Supreme Court’s nonobviousness decisions had failed to
supply the stability and uniformity that Congress envisioned when it enacted
section 103(a).84
C. Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”) and vested it with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeal cases.85 The purpose of the Federal Circuit was to bring
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
Anderson’s-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 58.
Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 273.
Id. at 275-77; Anderson’s-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 58.
Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282 (quoting Anderson’s-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 60-61).
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Mandel, supra note 63, at 328-33.
Mandel, supra note 63, at 328-30.
Id.
Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 330; U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966).
Mandel, supra note 63, at 328.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2006).
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consistency and uniformity to the field of patent law,86 and it has “taken its
role as defender of the patent system seriously.”87 Prior to the creation of
the Federal Circuit, courts strictly construed section 103(a) to regularly
invalidate patents for obviousness.88 However, if the patent did survive the
nonobviousness inquiry, the court would interpret the scope of the patent
broadly to reach as many infringing products or processes as possible.89 The
Federal Circuit sought to limit the reach of the nonobviousness requirement
by finding more patents valid but enforcing them much more narrowly.90
Prior to KSR, the Supreme Court had not revisited the nonobviousness
requirement for over thirty years and seemed content to allow the Federal
Circuit to rewrite its case law.91
The Federal Circuit quickly distanced itself from the Supreme
Court’s nonobviousness decisions in Anderson’s-Black Rock and Sakraida
and the synergy requirement.92 The Federal Circuit announced that it saw
no reason to continue the practice of differentiating between the different
types of patents by applying a “more stringent standard” to combination
patents.93 In addition to the four factors from Graham, the Federal Circuit
developed the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test (the “TSM test”) as
an additional framework for determining nonobviousness. The TSM test
required a showing of actual evidence that there was some teaching,
suggestion, or motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine
the prior art references used to demonstrate obviousness.94 This evidence
could come from a variety of sources, including the “prior art references
themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some
cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved.”95 “Broad conclusory
statements regarding the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are
not ‘evidence.’”96
One of the main purposes of the TSM test was to curb the problem
of hindsight bias.97 Because section 103(a) requires the court to step back in
time to when the invention was created, the Federal Circuit noted that the
nonobviousness inquiry frequently allowed courts to enter the “‘tempting
86

Trembath, supra note 58, at 36.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
88
Id. at 1.
89
Id. at 1-2.
90
Id. at 2.
91
Id. In Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810-11 (1986), the Supreme Court
issued a brief per curiam opinion reversing the Federal Court’s decision on obviousness based on the
standard of review applied.
92
Trembath, supra note 58, at 36-37.
93
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 663.
94
In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated in part by, In re Gartside, 203
F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 998-99.
87
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but forbidden zone of hindsight.’”98 A new invention that is groundbreaking at the time seems obvious with the passage of time and widespread
usage.99 The Federal Circuit noted that “the best defense against the subtle
but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis” is to
require a showing of an objective reason why a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have combined the references.100
Further compounding the problem of hindsight, patent applicants
are required to fully disclose how to make and use the invention.101
“Combining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion,
teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as a blueprint
for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability — the essence of
The Federal Circuit specifically noted that “less
hindsight.”102
technologically complex inventions” are especially prone to hindsight
bias.103
D. The KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. Decision
“Technological progress has merely provided us with more
efficient means for going backwards.” ~ Aldous Huxley104
After a relatively inactive period since the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court has taken a recent renewed interest in patent
law.105 The result of this renewed interest has often been unfavorable to the
rights of patent owners, signaling a return to a system that is hostile to patent
protection.106 Many practicing patent attorneys see these recent Supreme
Court decisions weakening a patent owner’s rights as a backlash against
some controversial patents that have been granted in recent years.107 It was
no accident that the Supreme Court chose the KSR case to express its
displeasure with the Federal Circuit’s TSM test.108 The case concerned a
98

Id. at 998 (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
Carl H. Hinneschiedt, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: No Obvious Changes for the Biotechnology
Market, 80 YALE J. OF BIOLOGY AND MED. 153, 156 (2007).
100
In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
101
Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
102
In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
103
Id.
104
Erich Taylor, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? "Brain Fingerprinting," the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 287,
287.
105
Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (2008).
Of the twenty patent or patent-related cases heard by the Supreme Court since 1982, eight have been
granted certiorari since 2005. Id.
106
Fox, supra note 47.
107
Id. Much of the recent furor over patents has been caused by the Federal Circuit’s decision to
grant patents for business methods. See generally Kathryn T. Ng, Comment, Tax Strategy Patents: Close
Pandora’s Box on Patenting Criminal Defense Strategies, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 253 (2009) (addressing
concerns with regard to granting tax strategy patents and subsequent patenting of criminal defense
strategies).
108
R. Polk Wagner, The Supreme Court and the Future of Patent Reform, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at
35, 39.
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classic combination invention with relatively simple technology involving
elements that were widely known in the prior art.109
1. Background of the Invention and Procedural History
Teleflex’s patent was for an adjustable accelerator pedal assembly
for an automobile that incorporated an electronic sensor for communication
with the computer chip controlling the throttle in the car’s engine.110 Prior
to the 1990s, automobile accelerator pedals physically interacted with the
throttle in the engine “via cable or other mechanical link.”111 The driver
pressed on the pedal, the cable pulled open valves in the engine, and the car
accelerated.112 In the 1970s, designers created adjustable pedals that could
accommodate drivers of differing heights by moving the pedal forward or
backward in the footwell without changing the amount of force necessary to
push the pedal down.113 With the advent of computer-controlled throttles, it
was no longer necessary to have the physical link between the pedal and the
engine, but the car’s computer chip still had to be advised of the pedal’s
position.114 Inventors solved this problem by using electronic sensors with
wires connected to the chip.115 Several prior art patents disclosed several
locations for the sensor on a fixed part of the pedal assembly to avoid
various problems, such as chafing on the wires connecting the sensor to the
computer.116 The prior art patents separately disclosed each of the elements
in Teleflex’s patent, but no single patent contained every single element,
implicating section 103(a) and the nonobviousness inquiry.117
Teleflex Inc. sued KSR International Co. for infringement of its
patent for an adjustable accelerator pedal assembly.118 The District Court
found the disputed portion of the patent to be obvious in light of the prior art
and granted summary judgment in favor of KSR.119 The District Court
found “little difference” between the prior art and Teleflex’s patented pedal
assembly.120 The District Court held that the TSM test had been satisfied by
showing that the relevant prior art disclosed all elements of Teleflex’s
invention and that the “state of the industry would lead inevitably to
combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals . . . .”121
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In reversing the District Court, the Federal Circuit held that the
lower court had incorrectly applied the TSM test.122 The Federal Circuit
found that the District Court failed to make specific findings as to the
“understanding or principal within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that
would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention” to attach
the electronic sensor to the pivot point of this particular adjustable
accelerator pedal assembly, rather than to one of the many other fixed
attachment points that were available.123 The Federal Circuit held that there
must exist not only a motivation to combine the prior art references but also
a motivation to combine them in the “particular manner claimed.”124 In
addition, the cited prior art was designed to solve different problems than
those sought to be solved by Teleflex’s patent; therefore, a person having
ordinary skill in the art would not necessarily have turned to the teachings of
those prior art patents to solve the problem presented.125
2. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit,
finding that Teleflex’s combination of elements from the prior art was
obvious.126 The Court began by condemning the Federal Circuit’s
nonobviousness analysis as too rigid.127 The Court stated that the case law
demanded a “broad inquiry” and a “flexible approach” to the
nonobviousness inquiry.128 While expressing disapproval for the Federal
Circuit’s application of its TSM test, the Supreme Court did affirm the basic
principle underlying the TSM test.129 In determining whether a combination
patent is obvious, the Court noted that it can be helpful to identify the reason
why a person of ordinary skill would have been prompted to combine those
known elements in the way claimed in the patent.130 The Court stated that
the TSM test is not incompatible with the Graham analysis, so long as the
TSM test is not applied too rigidly.131
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Id.
Id. at 413-14.
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
KSR, 550 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 415.
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Id. at 418-19.
Id.
Id. at 419.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss3/6

2010]

NO PATENT FOR YOU!

427

While the Supreme Court did not completely dismiss the TSM test,
it provided little additional guidance for the legal aspect of the
nonobviousness inquiry and failed to create a clear objective framework for
future courts. The Court reiterated a variation of its “synergistic result”
requirement from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp.: an invention obtained by combining “familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.”132 The Court also reemphasized the degree
of caution necessary in examining a combination patent.133
In addition, the Court assigned error to the Federal Circuit’s holding
that a patent claim cannot be proven obvious by showing that the
combination was “obvious to try.”134 Where there is a “design need or
market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of
identified, predictable solutions,” an invention obtained from pursuit of
these known solutions is “likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense.”135 In these situations, the combination
may be found obvious under section 103(a) because it was “obvious to
try.”136
The Court also added that common sense teaches that “familiar
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes,” and a “person
of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together
like pieces of a puzzle.”137 A reviewing court should take into consideration
“inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ” in assessing the obviousness.138
The Supreme Court concluded that Teleflex’s pedal was obvious as
a predictable combination of elements from the prior art.139 One prior art
patent taught everything contained in Teleflex’s invention except the sensor
placement.140 Several other prior art patents taught placement of the sensor
on a nonmoving part of the pedal assembly, and the “most obvious
nonmoving point” on Teleflex’s pedal assembly was the pivot point.141 In
addition, there was a strong market incentive to make the conversion from
mechanical to electronic pedals, rendering Teleflex’s patent obvious.142
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Finally, the KSR decision devoted a single paragraph in its opinion
spanning almost twenty pages to addressing the problem of hindsight bias.143
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit had drawn the “wrong
conclusion” from “the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to
hindsight bias.”144 The Court stated that “[a] factfinder should be aware, of
course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias” but that common sense
should also be applied to the obviousness inquiry.145
E. The Aftermath of KSR
The most significant effects of KSR will likely be felt at the entry
point into the patent system, which is the patent application.146 In response
to KSR, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”), has
changed its patent examining procedures regarding nonobviousness.147 The
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (the “MPEP”) now incorporates
seven exemplary rationales that may be used to support a rejection for
obviousness, several of which come directly from KSR.148 In addition,
USPTO allowance rates for patent applications have been plunging
precipitously over the last several years.149 The allowance rate held steady
between 60-70% from the mid-1970s until around 2001, when it began
143

Id. at 421.
Id.
Id.
146
Fox, supra note 47 (noting that the USPTO now has more options than ever to reject a patent for
obviousness).
147
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2141-42 (8th ed. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]. The USPTO is the government
agency with the primary responsibility for examining patent applications, and the MPEP contains the
procedures used by examiners at the USPTO to determine the validity of patent applications. The most
current version of the Manual (8th ed., rev. 7, July 2008) remains unchanged in relevant part. See U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Non-Provisional (Utility) Patent Application, A Guide to Filing: A Guide
to Filing a Non-Provisional (Utility) Patent Application, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/
types/utility.jsp (last visited May 2, 2010).
148
MPEP, § 2141 sec. III. The seven rationales are:
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable
results;
(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable
results;
(C) Use of [a] known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products)
in the same way;
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for
improvement to yield predictable results;
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success;
(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in
either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other market
forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art;
(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led
one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art
reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.
Id.
149
JOHN F. SALAZAR, HINDSIGHT AND RESPONDING TO OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS 2 (Nov. 9, 2008),
http://www.aipla.org/html/annual/2008/Papers/Salazar-slides.pdf.
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falling rapidly to its current rate of approximately 40%.150 Coincidentally,
one of the most significant drops occurred from 2007-08 when the rate fell
almost a full 10%, which is also around the time that the KSR decision was
issued.151
Moreover, as many patent practitioners feared, recent statistics for
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the “BPAI”)152 reflect an
upward trend since the 2007 KSR decision in favor of affirming section
103(a) obviousness rejections from the USPTO.153 The BPAI currently
affirms approximately 70% of rejections made on obviousness grounds from
the USPTO.154 With so many ways to reject a patent for obviousness, it is
not surprising that the statistics would reflect an increase in section 103(a)
rejections at both the USPTO and the BPAI.
The Federal Circuit has also changed the way in which it analyzes
the nonobviousness requirement in response to KSR. In Leapfrog Enters.,
Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc., the first post-KSR nonobviousness decision, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding that the invention was
obvious.155 Leapfrog sued Fisher-Price, alleging that Fisher-Price’s product
infringed Leapfrog’s patent.156 The invention in Leapfrog was an electronic
“learning device to help young children read phonetically,” and the cited
prior art consisted of two similar learning toys, one electro-mechanical and
one completely electrical.157 In part, Leapfrog argued that the lower court
had not presented sufficient evidence regarding the motivation to combine
the two prior art patents.158 While a lack of evidence regarding motivation
to combine the prior art patents might have been sufficient prior to KSR, the
Federal Circuit held that the use of modern electronics to update mechanical
devices was “reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill” in the art.159
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit also held that Leapfrog had presented no
evidence that the combination of elements was “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.”160 These statements,
particularly the latter one, indicated a change in the Federal Circuit’s
attitude towards the nonobviousness requirement.
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Although it is still too early to discern the full effects of the KSR
ruling on the Federal Circuit, the indications are mixed regarding the
direction the court will take for the nonobviousness requirement. Prior to
KSR, the Federal Circuit’s rulings on appeals from infringement cases were
split fairly evenly, with a slight bias toward finding the questioned patent
nonobvious and valid.161 Post-KSR, the Federal Circuit seems slightly more
inclined to invalidate patents for obviousness. In the twelve months
following KSR, the Federal Circuit found patents invalid in almost 60% of
the cases where obviousness was involved.162 While this number reflects an
increase, it does not appear to be a significant departure from the court’s
pre-KSR statistics. In addition, one Federal Circuit judge stated that he
understood the KSR ruling to have little effect on the Federal Circuit’s
approach to the nonobviousness analysis.163 It remains to be seen what the
long-term effects of KSR will be on the nonobviousness inquiry at the
Federal Circuit level.
III. ANALYSIS
Science progresses incrementally via the scientific method by using
known methods to test educated predictions. The United States Supreme
Court in KSR v. Teleflex stated that inventions created “according to known
methods . . . [that] yield predictable results” are unpatentable,164 which is in
direct conflict with the scientific method. In addition, the Court has failed to
provide clear guidance regarding hindsight bias, a problem that is
particularly important for inventions achieved using the scientific method.
If the USPTO, the BPAI, and the courts interpret portions of the KSR
decision literally, then almost every invention achieved using the scientific
method will be rendered obvious and unpatentable. This result would
prevent, not promote, the progress of the arts in direct opposition to the
constitutional mandate of the Intellectual Property Clause.
A. The KSR Decision Reinstated an Unreasonably High and Unpredictable
Nonobviousness Standard
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
~ George Santayana165
161
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of
Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 934, 953 (2007). The Federal Circuit tends to show
deference to the USPTO and affirms its finding regarding obviousness over 85% of the time. Id. at 93738.
162
JOHN T. JOHNSON, OBVIOUSNESS AND KSR – ONE YEAR LATER 11 (Apr. 17, 2008),
http://www.aipla.org/Content/Microsites152/IP_Practice_in_Japan/Committee_Meetings/2008-04_Japan
_Trip/Presentations13/JPAA-KSR-Litigation-(John-Johnson).ppt. The Federal Circuit continues to show
deference to the USPTO’s findings, affirming 100% of its findings. Id. at 16.
163
Wagner, supra note 108, at 41.
164
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
165
GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 82 (1953).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss3/6

2010]

NO PATENT FOR YOU!

431

The patent system strives to balance the rights of the inventor with
the rights of the public, and the nonobviousness requirement plays an
important role in effectuating that goal. The requirement exists to prevent
inventors from obtaining patent protection for combination inventions that
remove important building blocks from the public domain. However, the
KSR decision needlessly expanded the breadth and scope of the
nonobviousness requirement. While the USPTO and the Federal Circuit
may have allowed some seemingly ridiculous patents in the past,166 the
better solution for the problem may have simply been to invalidate the
offending patents or remove their subject matter from patentability.
Nevertheless, the KSR decision raised the bar for patentability unnecessarily
high and failed to provide clear guidance as to what level of inventiveness
will satisfy the nonobviousness requirement.
In the KSR decision, the Supreme Court seemed to reinstate a
nonobviousness standard similar to the “flash of genius” standard from
Cuno Engineering, which was specifically abolished by the enactment of 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).167 The KSR decision stated that an invention obtained by
combining “familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”168 Under this
standard, an invention is likely to be unpatentable unless the result achieved
is something extraordinary and unexpected. However, because the scientific
method involves the prediction of an outcome from the use of known
methods, any result derived from the use of the scientific method will, by
definition, be a predictable result of combining familiar elements according
to known methods, thereby making it unpatentable under KSR.
Additionally, KSR opened up the possibility that an invention may
be proven to be obvious by showing that it was “obvious to try.”169 The
Federal Circuit had consistently held that the fact that something was
obvious to try was insufficient to render the invention obvious.170 The KSR
decision stated that a “design need or market pressure to solve a problem . . .
[with] a finite number of identified, predictable solutions” may render an
invention unpatentable as “obvious to try.”171 An invention obtained using
the scientific method will almost always be unpatentable under this standard
because a scientist following the scientific method attempts to solve an
identified problem by taking an inventory of the known methods available
and making a prediction as to which one is the best avenue to pursue. While
166
See Daniel Wright, Patently Silly, http://www.patentlysilly.com/index.php (last visited May 2,
2010) (lamenting the issuance of patents for an array of inventions of questionable utility).
167
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (noting that the last sentence of section 103(a)
was intended to abolish the “flash of genius” standard from Cuno Engineering).
168
KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
169
Id. at 421.
170
In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A general incentive does not make obvious a
particular result, nor does the existence of techniques by which those efforts can be carried out.”).
171
KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.

Published by eCommons, 2009

432

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

some inventions are accidental, almost every inventor works toward
achieving a specific goal, and that goal is often driven by a demonstrated
need in the market. If an invention is obvious because of this reality, the
incentive to continue trying to “build the better mousetrap” will be
significantly diminished. Thus, the assertion that a combination patent can
be found invalid simply because it was obvious to try has serious
implications for many inventions, particularly those obtained using the
scientific method.
These statements in KSR could potentially have a chilling effect on
progress and innovation. In particular, corporations may be reluctant to
invest the time and money in research and development if the legal costs to
obtain a patent rise dramatically and there is reduced predictability
regarding the ability to acquire patent protection for that investment.
Furthermore, small inventors may find it much too expensive to obtain
patents due to the increased amount of work for the patent attorney.172
Research and development is the backbone of scientific progress and is an
important part of a healthy economy. Lack of predictability and increased
legal costs could eventually lead to a downturn in scientific research in all
areas and a decrease in the number of patents filed and issued.
The patent system needs a practical and objective framework for
analyzing nonobviousness in order for it to achieve its goal of promoting the
progress of the arts and sciences. The nonobviousness requirement will
always involve an unavoidable element of subjectivity because the “person
of ordinary skill” standard is susceptible to many interpretations.173 The
Supreme Court condemned the Federal Circuit’s rigid use of the TSM test,
yet it failed to provide a clear and consistent test in its place. If the TSM
test is no longer acceptable, the Supreme Court must provide a better
roadmap for the USPTO and the lower courts to follow. Increased
flexibility for the USPTO, the BPAI, and the courts on the nonobviousness
standard translates into reduced predictability as to whether or not a patent
will be found valid. Rather than promoting innovation and encouraging
inventors to invest time and money in research, the judicial policy embodied
in the KSR decision could potentially restrain the advancement of the arts
and sciences in direct opposition to the constitutional mandate of the
Intellectual Property Clause.
B. The KSR Opinion Minimized and Failed to Address the Problem of
Hindsight Bias
In KSR, the Supreme Court underestimated the gravity and
172
Fox, supra note 47 (noting that the increased amount of work for patent attorneys could lead to an
increase in cost to obtain a patent, forcing smaller inventors to do more of the legal work themselves).
173
Hinneschiedt, supra note 99, at 153. The court establishes the fictitious legal “person of ordinary
skill in the art” through expert testimony, which inevitably leads to a battle of the experts. Id.
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pervasiveness of the problem of hindsight in the nonobviousness inquiry.
The Supreme Court simply stated that the factfinder should be aware of
However, this statement
hindsight bias and seek to avoid it.174
underestimates the pervasiveness of the problem of hindsight and fails to
offer an objective solution. Recent studies have shown that hindsight bias is
a much more serious problem than previously thought, and the current
judicial policies do little to prevent the problem.175 In light of the KSR
decision, the nonobviousness requirement could become an even more
significant hurdle to patentability in the absence of objective guidelines
designed to combat hindsight bias.
Section 103(a) requires the patent examiner and the court to step
back in time to consider whether the invention was obvious based only on
the prior art and knowledge at that time.176 In practice, this analysis is much
easier said than done. “Humans are cognitively unable to prevent
knowledge gained through hindsight . . . from impacting their analysis of
past events, as required for the proper non-obvious analysis.”177 This
problem is compounded by the fact that patentees are required to fully
disclose how to make and use their invention in order to receive patent
protection.178 Once the factfinder sees the solution, particularly how it was
achieved, the invention “appears to have been more obvious than it actually
was.”179
The effect of hindsight bias has been demonstrated in several recent
studies involving mock jurors, and the results are clear—hindsight is a much
more severe problem than initially expected.180 In one set of studies, jurors
were divided into two groups, with each group being given general
background information about the field of the invention, some relevant prior
art references, and a description of the problem the inventor was seeking to
solve.181 One set of jurors was shown the solution to the problem (the
invention), while the other set was not, with some very striking results.182 In
one scenario, only 34% of the jurors without knowledge of the solution
found the patent to be obvious, while 73% of the jurors who had seen the
invention found it to be obvious.183 In two different scenarios, the numbers
reflected a similar trend (49% vs. 85% and 23% vs. 59%).184 The studies
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revealed a hindsight effect of 36% to 39%.185
Another set of studies testing jury instructions revealed similar
results. One set of jurors received strong warnings about the possibility of
hindsight bias and were instructed to guard against it, while the other set of
jurors was not warned.187 The jurors who received the warnings regarding
hindsight bias showed little difference from jurors who did not receive any
instruction.188 The studies also showed that the Federal Circuit’s TSM test
and the Supreme Court’s Graham factors did very little to reduce hindsight
bias.189 These results indicate that a simple warning to the factfinder
regarding the potential for hindsight bias is insufficient to avoid or combat
it.190
186

The KSR decision provided several additional avenues through
which an invention can be found obvious, while providing no further
guidance for combating hindsight bias. For example, the opinion stated that
“any need or problem known in the field of endeavor” can serve as a basis
for establishing obviousness by showing that the invention was “obvious to
try.”191 This policy seems to be an invitation to courts and patent examiners
to “exercise hindsight in combining the prior art to render a claim invalid as
obvious.”192 The KSR opinion also stated that common sense and the
“inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ” should all be used in analysis of the invention for
nonobviousness,193 which seems to be a further invitation to engage in a
hindsight-based analysis. The case offers no guidelines to lower courts for
determining what constitutes common sense or permissible inferences and
creative steps in any given case.
The problem of hindsight bias is particularly evident with inventions
achieved using the scientific method. After identifying a particular problem,
researchers study the prior art in the field of endeavor and determine which
avenues appear promising based on what is already known in the area. Due
to the process of the scientific method, the building blocks of the resulting
invention will necessarily exist in the prior art, and the combination of those
elements to obtain the invention will seem much more obvious in
hindsight.194 As the Federal Circuit feared in In re Dembiczak, the patent
185
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applicant’s required disclosure detailing how to make and use the invention
could be the patent’s undoing.195 The applicant’s disclosure provides a
convenient roadmap into which the common sense and “inferences and
creative steps” of a person of ordinary skill in the art may be inserted to
show that the invention is obvious.196 Again, the KSR decision offers little
guidance for making the legal determination of when the combination of
elements is sufficiently obvious to render the patent invalid.
This lack of guidance for combating hindsight bias is apparent in the
USPTO’s examining procedures. Section 2142 of the MPEP states that the
“tendency to resort to ‘hindsight’ based upon [the patent] applicant’s
disclosure is often difficult to avoid due to the very nature of the
examination process,” but “impermissible hindsight must be avoided.”197
Besides this statement, the MPEP provides no additional guidance as to how
hindsight can be avoided. Coupled with the recently added ways in which
an examiner can reject an application for obviousness, the MPEP’s
ambiguous instruction regarding hindsight makes the need for an objective
framework to combat hindsight even more critical. Without clear and
objective guidelines, patents for inventions achieved using the scientific
method will be particularly vulnerable to a hindsight-based invalidation for
obviousness by the USPTO, the BPAI, and the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
To achieve the goal of the Intellectual Property Clause to promote
the progress of the arts and sciences, the patent system needs predictability
and certainty. The KSR opinion generated much controversy regarding the
status of the nonobviousness requirement, and yet it failed to transform and
clarify the requirement, as many on both sides of the issue hoped it would.
Although the full effects of KSR remain to be seen, the decision created
more questions than it answered, and the section 103(a) standard is now
perhaps higher and more confusing than ever. In particular, the judicial
policy created by the KSR decision appears to be in direct conflict with the
scientific method, and this policy has serious implications for the future of
research and development. KSR also failed to provide clear guidance for
combating hindsight bias, which is a particularly troublesome problem for
inventions achieved using the scientific method. It remains to be seen if the
Supreme Court will offer the clear, objective, and reliable guidelines
necessary for the patent law system to achieve its purpose, or if KSR v.
Teleflex will remain the primary law on the topic of obviousness.
biotechnology inventions “spring from known components and methodologies found in [the] prior art.”
Id.
195
In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (1999) (noting that patent applicant’s disclosure provides a
“blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability . . . .”).
196
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